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Explaining depression:  neuroscience 
is not enough, evolution is essential 
Randolph  M.  Nesse 
Neuroscience  provides proximate explanations based  on mechanisms, but a full biological 
explanation of depression also requires an evolutionary explanation of the origins and functions 
of the capacity for low mood.  Failure to recognize that both are essential slows progress. Mood 
regulates  patterns of investment as a function of environmental propitiousness. When invest­
ments are not resulting in progress towards a goal, low mood gives a fitness advantage. If a person 
cannot  give up an unreachable goal,  low mood can escalate  to clinical depression.  There  are 
several evolutionary reasons why brain systems that regulate mood are vulnerable to dysfunction. 
Introduction 
In the course of research for a book on why natural selection has left humans so vulnerable to 
depression, I asked three leading neuroscientists why the capacity for depression exists at alL One 
suggested that groups with a mix of optimists and pessimists do better than other groups. A second 
said that negative mood is harmful while good mood gets people to want to have sex and do other 
things that increase fitness. A third said that depression results from neurotransmitter-receptor 
abnormalities. 
These  responses  suggest that even some of the best neuroscientists are unfamiliar with evo­
lutionary principles that long ago transformed behavioural biology.  Evolutionary explanations 
based on benefits to the group have been recognized as problematic for 40 years (Williams, 1966). 
The belief that positive emotions are useful but negative emotions are harmful is an illusion 
(Nesse, 2004). Finally, reductionist explanations for why some individuals get depressed do not 
address the question of why depression exists (Kendler, 2005). 
Perhaps more  important than specific misunderstandings, however, is the larger problem 
of widespread failure to recognize that biological traits need both evolutionary and proximate 
explanations. Neuroscience can never provide a full biological explanation for depression, it can 
only explain mechanisms. Progress will speed up when we concurrently address the evolutionary 
question of why depression exists at alL This thesis is supported by considering  how the appli­
cation of how three simple evolutionary principles  can advance  depression  research.  The first 
principle is that proximate explanations based on brain mechanisms are insufficient; every trait 
also needs an evolutionary explanation.  The second is that diseases do not have evolutionary 
explanations, however evolution can explain why some aspects of the body have been left vulner­
able to failure. Third, many symptoms, such as pain, fever, cough, and negative emotions, are not 
usually the result of bodily defects, they are adaptive responses shaped by natural selection.  The 
brain mechanisms that regulate these  responses  are vulnerable to dysregulation; we need to find 
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Proximate and evolutionary questions 
Asking evolutionary  as well as  proximate  questions long ago transformed the study of animal 
behaviour  (Alcock, 2005; Alcock and Sherman, 1994; Dewsbury, 1999; Krebs and Davies, 1984). 
The crucial advance was Tin  bergen's (  1963) observation that a full biological explanation of any 
trait requires answers to four questions: two proximate and two evolutionary (Box 3.1). Modern 
animal-behaviour texts begin with these four questions (Alcock, 1993; Beckhoff and Allen, 1995; 
Krebs and Davies, 1997), but with a few exceptions (Gazzaniga, 2004); neuroscience texts do not 
mention them. 
As Tinbergen and Mayr emphasized (Dewsbury, 1999; Mayr, 1982; Tin bergen, 1963), proximate 
and  evolutionary  questions are not alternatives; answers to both are  essential for any complete 
explanation. Proximate explanations describe the mechanistic details of a trait - its composition 
and structure at all levels, how the mechanism works, and how it arises in the course of ontogeny. 
Evolutionary explanations describe how a trait came to be the way it is- the historical sequence of 
previous traits and the evolutionary forces that shaped the trait. For instance, a proximate expla­
nation for the human locus coeruleus includes the details of its anatomy, chemistry, connections, 
and its developmental origins. An evolutionary explanation describes its phylogeny, and how its 
functions give a selective advantage  (presumably  by  regulating  noradrenergic  transmission and 
coordinating the emergency response). 
Evolutionary hypotheses in neuroscience 
Much neuroscience is  devoted  to studies  of adaptive  function,  however  only rarely are such 
studies recognized as tests of evolutionary hypotheses about how a trait influences fitness 
(Box 3.2). Instead, neural components are often presumed to have specific functions- as parts of 
the 'brain as a machine'. This approach has generated much knowledge, but it can be misleading 
(Childs,  1999; N  esse and  Stearns,  2008).  Machines have discrete parts engineered to serve one 
or a few functions.  Organisms are products of sequential tiny changes over millions of genera­
tions that result in partially differentiated components that may serve many functions. They are 
hard to reverse engineer because they were not designed by an engineer. Far from implying that 
traits are perfect, an  evolutionary approach shows why many of the body's 'design' are botched, 
at best  (Crespi, 2000; Nesse, 2005b;  Nesse and Williams, 1994; Williams, 1996; Williams and 
Nesse, 1991). An evolutionary view suggests that we should expect evolved brains to  be jumbles 
of incompletely differentiated, jury-rigged parts with multiple overlapping functions. 
One conclusion is that few brain structures should have only one or two specific clearly describ­
able  functions.  Instead,  multiple actions, which may or may not correspond  to our notions of 
functions, are distributed across many  cross-connected incompletely differentiated structures. 
Box 3.1  Tinbergen's four questions (Tinbergen, 1963) 
Two proximate questions (about mechanisms) 
1.  Mechanism- What are the trait's components and how do they work? 
2.  Ontogeny- What is the ontogeny of this trait? 
Two evolutionary questions (about origins) 
3.  Phylogeny- What is the phylogeny of this trait? 
4.  Adaptive  function- What selective advantages/costs and other  evolutionary factors 
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Box  3.2  Testing  evolutionary hypotheses 
Like other scientific hypotheses,  proposals about a trait's evolutionary origins or functions 
can be easy, difficult, or temporarily impossible to test. A controversy that began with Gould 
and Lewontin's critique of'adaptationist' thinking (1979) has been both helpful and harmful. 
The benefit is increased attention to all potential explanations, including  genetic drift and 
other evolutionary factors other than natural selection (Pigliucci and Kaplan,  2000). The cost 
is a widespread  misimpression that evolutionary  hypotheses are untestable, 'just-so-stories'. 
'  This notion persists despite many effective  rebuttals  (Alcock, 1998; Borgia, 1994; Queller, 
1995; Selzer, 1993) 
The issue arises in large part because proximate scientists are unfamiliar with the methods 
used to test  evolutionary hypotheses  (Alcock,  2005;  Mace et al.  2003;  Mayr,  1983; Nesse, 
1999d; Reeve and Sherman, 1993; Rose and Lauder, 1996; Stearns and Hoekstra, 2005;). When 
applicable, the comparative method is strong (Pagel, 1994). For instance, the shape and size of 
beaks in different species of finches correlates well with the kinds of foods available, and when 
only harder seeds are available, beaks become thicker in just a few generations (Grant, 1999). 
Only rarely do neuroscientists have access to data that allow such comparisons  (Butler and 
Hodos, 1996; Glenn Northcutt and Kaas, 1995; Panksepp et al.  2002). 
Extirpation is a mainstay  for physiological studies of function; take out an organ and see 
what goes wrong. From the studies-of patients with localized brain damage to knock-out mice 
or aspiration of brain structures, neuroscientists routinely test hypotheses about the adaptive 
functions of genes (Alcock,  2005; Mayr, 1983; Rose and Lauder,  1996b),  neurotransmitters, 
receptors,  and brain  structures  (Bloom,  1994; Gazzaniga, 1995;  Kandel et al.  2000).  Such 
studies are rarely recognized as tests of evolutionary hypotheses about adaptive functions. 
Assessing form in relation to function is a mainstay in general biology, where its challenges 
are recognized. When the details of a trait exactly match those that would well serve a func­
tion, that is useful evidence.  Stronger  evidence is provided by predicting  previously  unob­
served details. For behavioural traits, the situations that elicit the behaviour may provide the 
best available evidence. 
The distributed regulation of motivation offers a good example (Berridge,  2004). Other chapters 
in this volume illustrate both the value and the difficulties of trying to localize functions. This is 
discouraging to the goal of fully understanding the brain, but it helps to explain why neuroscience is 
so difficult. It is not just because the systems are complex, but because the brain's components and 
connections do not  have  a coherent organization of the  sort  found  in human  -designed machines. 
Bodies are not irreducibly complex, but some aspects may be indescribably complex. 
Many studies address the functions of neurotransmitters and receptors in depression and other 
disorders  (Barnes and Sharp,  1999).  Most propose  one or a few  functions  for each transmitter 
or receptor, sometimes framed in terms of effects on other neural structures, and sometimes in 
terms of effects on cognition or behaviour. Dopamine, for instance, has long been said to mediate 
motivation and reward. On deeper analysis this turns out to be far too simple  (Berridge,  2004; 
Salamone et al.  2005; Wise, 2004). 
An evolutionary approach provides a different perspective on the origins of traits in conjunction 
with functions.  For instance,  duplication of receptor or transmitter  genes can give advantages 
by allowing more exact control of different tissues  (Fryxell, 1995; Roth et al. 1982). The pro­
opiomelanocortin (POMC) gene was duplicated before the appearance of the jawed fish, thus paving 
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for POMC peptides now differ in different species (Takahashi and Kawauchi, 2006). Differentiation 
of  function in different tissues gives the selective advantage that drives this process, however the 
functions that are served by different opiods and MSH's  are multiple and hard to describe. 
The animal  behaviour literature contains  extensive discussions about how to  specify objects 
of evolutionary explanation, and how to  pose and test specific hypotheses (Alcock, 2005; Reeve 
and Sherman, 1993; Rose and Lauder, 1996). Debates continue, but they are settling down, at 
least about core issues (Alcock, 2001; Rose and Lauder, 1996; SegerstriHe, 2000). In neuroscience 
the topic is curiously neglected; I  suspect this is because there is incomplete recognition that 
proximate and evolutionary questions are separate, and because some neuroscientists, having 
never been exposed to the methods for testing such hypotheses, proceed as if data on proximate 
mechanisms can answer such questions. 
Evolutionary explanations for diseases 
An evolutionary approach to depression does not mean proposing that depressive disorders are 
useful.  Attempts to find  direct  evolutionary explanations for a  disease are misguided because 
natural selection does not shape diseases. Selection and genetic drift can, however, explain aspects 
of the body that leave it vulnerable to  a disease, such as wisdom teeth, a small birth canal, and a 
low anxiety  threshold  (Williams  and Nesse,  1991).  Asking and answering such questions  has 
contributed to the rapid growth of evolutionary medicine (http://evmedreview.com, 2008; Nesse 
and Stearns, 2008; Nesse and Williams, 1994; Stearns and Ebert, 2001; Stearns and Koella, 2007; 
Stearns et a!. 2007; Trevathan et a!. 2008). Much progress has been made in discovering why aging 
occurs  (Finch, 2007), why natural selection has not resulted in better protection against cancer 
(Frank, 2007; Greaves, 2002), and why we are so vulnerable to anxiety (McGuire and Troisi, 1998; 
Nesse, 1999a). 
There are six evolutionary reasons  why a trait may have  'design'  features that leave bodies 
vulnerable to a disease (Box 3.3). For a list, see the text box below, for details, see primary sources 
(Evolution and Medicine Review, 2008; N  esse and Stearns, 2008; N  esse and Williams, 1994; Stearns 
and Ebert, 2001;  Stearns and Koella, 2007;  Stearns et a!. 2007;  Trevathan et a!. 2008). The last 
item, adaptive responses, is not really a reason for vulnerability, but it belongs on the list because 
responses such as pain, cough, and fever are sometimes confused with diseases. They are respons­
es useful in specific circumstances; selection has shaped systems that express the response when 
they detect cues associated with those circumstances. For instance, lipolysaccharide (LPS), whose 
presence is strongly correlated with a bacterial infection, arouses an inflammatory response. 
Explaining vulnerability to one disease may require several kinds of explanations. For instance, 
vulnerability to.atherosclerosis results  from a combination of  mismatch,  pathogen  evolution, 
constraints and tradeoffs and adaptive responses (Nesse and Weder, 2007). 
The first task in an evolutionary analysis of a medical condition is to determine if it arises 
directly from a bodily defect or if it is an adaptive response to a more fundamental problem. For 
example, paralysis, seizures, hallucinations, and cancer are direct manifestations of bodily defects. 
They have no utility. In contrast, pain, fever, cough, and anxiety are not defects or diseases, they 
are adaptive responses to more fundamental problems (Nesse, 2005c). 
Why are such reactions so aversive? Imagine if they were not. A few rare people have a con­
genital  inability  to experience pain. They are almost all dead by early adulthood  (Rosemberg 
et a!. 1994; Sternbach, 1963). The experience of pain means something is wrong, but the capacity 
for pain is an essential adaptation. What about anxiety? Patients with too much anxiety crowd 
clinics. Those with hypophobia don't complain, but some get into trouble and others die young 
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Box 3.3  Six evolutionary explanations for vulnerability 
l.  Infection by agents that evolve faster than we do 
2.  Mismatch between our bodies and novel environments 
3.  Constraints on what selection can do 
4.  Tradeoffs that limit the perfection of any trait 
5.  Traits that increase reproduction at the expense of health 
6.  Protective responses such as pain, fever, cough, and anxiety 
Like everything else in the body, the mechanisms that regulate protective responses can fail, 
causing conditions such as chronic pain and anxiety disorders. Even responses from intact regu­
lation mechanisms can cause problems. For instance, fever can result in seizures, and diarrhoea 
can cause dehydration and death. These dire consequences seem to suggest that natural selection 
has done a poor job of shaping the regulation mechanisms. The relative safety of using drugs to 
block fever, cough, and diarrhoea further suggests that natural selection may not be able to shape 
effective regulation mechanisms. 
However, false alarms are normal and inevitable for bodily defences. A full analysis of the 
optimal threshold for expressing a defence requires signal detection theory  (Nesse, 2005c). In 
general, however, the cost of a false alarm is likely to be small compared to the cost of failing to 
activate the protective state when it is needed, so the optimal response threshold results in many 
false alarms.  Fleeing in response to the sound of a breaking twig costs only a few calories. Not 
fleeing may be infinitely costly if the sound was made by a lion.  False alarms are normal and 
common. This is the 'smoke detector principle' (Nesse, 2005c). 
As with other diseases, serious depression is not an adaptation shaped by natural selection. 
It has no evolutionary explanation. However, we do need an evolutionary explanation for why 
natural selection has left us so vulnerable to a disease as common and devastating as depres­
sion. Some abnormal depression is related to normal low mood, so explaining the origins and 
functions of mood is an essential foundation for understanding depression. 
The utility of emotions and mood 
Emotions and moods give organisms a selective advantage by adjusting physiological and cognitive 
parameters to deal with situations that  have repeatedly influenced fitness over the course of 
evolution (Ekman,  1992; Keltner et al. 2006; Nesse,  1990; Panksepp,  1998; Plutchik, 2003; Tooby 
and Cosmides,  1990). Moods are longer in duration and less tightly  tied to specific cues than 
emotions, but both are special modes for coping with certain situations (Nesse, 1999c; 2006, 
Thayer, 1996). Single-celled organisms have two behaviours: move towards resources or away from 
danger (Adler, 1966; Larsen et al. 197  4). From these primal origins, behavioural activation (BAS) and 
behavioural inhibition  (BIS) brain systems developed; they increase fitness in situations character­
ized by opportunity/gain or threat/loss, respectively (Barrett, 2006; Gray,  1987; Watson et al.  1988). 
Moods and emotions are almost all positive or negative because neutral situations do not 
influence fitness (Barrett, 2006; Nesse,  1990; 1999c). Natural selection has differentiated generic 
positive and negative states into more specialized emotions that are helpful (on average) in the 
specific situations that a species has encountered (Nesse, 2004;  Plutchik,  1980).  The so-called 
'basic emotions' correspond to especially common well-defined situations, such as threat (for 
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Positive emotions seem more useful than negative ones because they are elicited in propitious 
situations.  In situations involving threat or loss, negative moods and emotions are more useful. 
They adjust physiology, motivation, and behaviour to cope with such situations involving threats 
or losses (Nesse, 1990; 1999c; Plutchik, 2003; Tooby and Cosmides, 1990).  For instance, Walter 
Cannon long ago recognized the utility of the emergency response in situations that required fight 
or flight (Cannon, 1914). This emergency system has false alarms; when recurrent, they are called 
panic disorder (Nesse, 1987). 
Depression 
Much neuroscience research proceeds on the assumption that 'depression is a brain disease'. This 
is certainly  correct in the sense that all mood and behaviour  is mediated  by brain mechanisms 
(Kendler, 2005). In some cases, it is correct in the more specific sense that depression arises from 
primary brain abnormalities. The slogan has also helped the public to understand that depression 
is not a personal failing, but a treatable condition. 
However, assuming that depression is a brain disease limits scientific progress in several ways 
(Kendler,  2005;  Moncrieff,  2007).  First, it implies that genetic and brain variations that predis­
pose to depression are abnormalities, when they may be neutral, or even advantageous, in certain 
environments.  Second,  it neglects the role of life events and other  causal  factors  that interact 
with brain variations to  cause most depression. Third, it implies that depression symptoms are 
pathological, distracting attention from the task of finding the functions for normal low mood. 
Fourth, it implies that brain changes associated with depression are abnormalities, although they 
can equally well reflect the normal actions of mechanisms that mediate mood (Halbreich, 2006; 
Mayberg et a!.  1999).  Finally,  diagnostic  criteria based only on symptoms  encourage  studying 
major depression as if it is one condition with one aetiology, although it can have many different 
aetiologies (Antonijevic, 2006; Keller and Nesse, 2005; Kendler, 2005). 
In contrast, an evolutionary perspective recognizes that depression symptoms can be normal or 
abnormal  depending  on the situation  (Horwitz  and Wakefield,  2007),  that multiple factors may 
combine to  cause a single  case of depression, that etiological factors may differ  markedly  from 
case to case (Nesse, 2006), and that different depression symptoms may have been shaped to cope 
with different precipitating situations (Keller and Nesse, 2006a). Before even addressing aetiology­
proximate explanations for why one person gets pathological  depression and another does not -
an evolutionary approach addresses the more fundamental questions of why the capacity for low 
mood exists at all, how it is normally regulated, and how it is related to some cases of depression. 
Is  mood an adaptation?  General  evidence 
The hypothesis that the capacity for mood is normal and useful is supported by its universality, 
as contrasted with abnormal phenomena such as seizures and hallucinations that most people 
never experience. So many people now assume that 'depression' refers to an abnormal state that 
the  phrases low mood and high mood are adopted  here to  describe the range from  despair  to 
elation without any implication of normality or abnormality. 
Stronger evidence that the capacity for mood is an adaptation is provided by the close regulation 
of mood by the fitness implications of a situation. Fast progress towards a valued resource elicits 
positive mood; lack of progress lowers mood.  Selection can shape regulation systems only for 
traits important to fitness, such as breathing and anxiety. The stimuli that influence mood are less 
tangible than those that regulate breathing, but there is no doubt that mood is carefully regulated 
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Direct evidence for the utility of a response is provided by individuals who lack the capacity. 
For instance, and as discussed above, individuals born with no capacity for pain experience accu­
mulating damage that causes death by early adulthood (Rosemberg et a!. 1994; Sternbach, 1963). 
It would be difficult to distinguish individuals who lack low mood from the merely fortunate. 
Nonetheless, if mood is useful, then individuals who lack a capacity for low mood have a disorder. 
If and when we discover drugs that reliably block low mood, this will make it possible to study the 
functions of low mood directly. In the meanwhile,  insight comes from the problems caused by 
hypomania (Doran, 2008). Inability to experience low mood results not only in social complica­
tions, but also in tendencies to make impulsive decisions and to start too many projects. Whether 
it results in persisting too long in fruitless enterprises is yet to be conformed. 
The evolutionary origins of low mood 
The above background guides correct formulation of the core question: In what kinds of situa­
tions arising repeatedly over evolutionary history would individuals with a capacity for low mood 
get .a fitness advantage? On the face of it, pessimism, lack of initiative, low self-worth, and fatigue 
seem worse than useless. However, in situations when all possible actions will bring costs greater 
than benefits, the best thing to do is ...  nothing. 
A seminal  article by Klinger  (1975) initiated modern work on mood as an adaptation that 
regulates goal pursuit. He noted that rapid progress towards a goal arouses high mood that 
motivates continued effort and risk-taking. When efforts to reach a goal are failing, low mood 
motivates pulling back to conserve resources and reconsider options. If conditions do not 
improve and no other strategy is viable, low mood disengages motivation from the unreachable 
goal so efforts can be turned to more productive activities. If the individual persists in pursuing an 
unreachable goal, ordinary negative affect can escalate into pathological depression. 
In a series of articles (1983;  1990) and a book (1998), Carver and Scheier outline a control 
theory model supported by experimental data showing that mood is influenced mainly, not by 
levels of resources or payoffs, but by the rate of approach to a goal. In a particularly important 
finding, negative mood is aroused more readily by obstacles encountered in pursuit of positive 
goals than it is by the inability to escape dangers (Carver, 2004).  This challenges models for 
depression based only on stress and losses (Blanchard et al. 1993), and suggests deeper attention 
to personal goals and the BAS. 
Many are now studying the exigencies that arise in the pursuit of personal goals (Emmons, 
1999; Emmons and King, 1988; Little, 2000). Klinger calls these 'current concerns', Little calls 
them problems arising in 'personal projects' (Little, 2006), while others focus on 'possible selves' 
(Cantor, 1990; Oyserman and Markus, 1990). Studies of the life course document increasing 
distress as it becomes apparent that a goal, such as having children, will not be met. When the 
goal is finally given up, negative affect decreases abruptly (Heckhausen et al. 2001). Other studies 
show that the impact of a life event depends profoundly on an individual's values (Diener and 
Fujita, 1995), and life context (Brown and Harris, 1978; Finlay-Jones and Brown, 1981; Monroe 
and Simons, 1991). 
Why do  people persist in pursuing unreachable goals? Each of several reasons is a different 
pathway to depression. Extreme ambition may leave a person dissatisfied even with exceptional 
achievements. A wish to please everyone is a common unreachable goal, as is trying to reform an 
abusive or alcoholic partner. Anxiety can prevent taking the risks necessary to escape an untenable 
life situation. Even without these factors, many people find themselves trapped pursuing an unat­
tainable goal. The word 'goal' suggests tangible things such as getting a job, but many of life's larg­
est goals are more personal, such as getting a spouse to be affectionate, finding sexual satisfaction, 24  I  EXPLAINING  DEPRESSION.  �IEUROSCIENCE  IS  NOT  ENOUGH,  EVOLUTION  IS  ESSE�ITIAL 
pleasing a parent, becoming recognized as a poet, or helping a child to get off drugs. Giving up such 
goals can mean giving up what gives meaning to life and a social identity. 
Individuals differ  in their  general  ability  to disengage from unreachable goals  (Wrosch and 
Scheier, 2003). Those more capable of giving up are less prone to low mood, as are those who 
reengage more quickly after a loss (Wrosch et al. 2003). These findings challenge the conventional 
wisdom that persistence is always wise, and they suggest studies to  determine whether depression 
remission often follows finding a new strategy or giving up a goal. Existing evidence finds depression 
much more prevalent in women who have experienced a 'fresh start' event (Brown et al. 1992). 
The general  idea that low mood arises  when desires cannot  be satisfied is by no means new 
(Nussbaum, 1994). What is new is trying to understand how the capacity for mood was shaped 
by its ability to increase fitness in certain situations.  The most general answer is: mood regulates 
patterns of resource investment as a function of propitiousness (Nesse, 1991; 1999b; 2000). In a pro­
pitious environment, small investments offer big payoffs, so high mood and risk-taking increase 
fitness.  In an unpropitious  environment,  costs and risks are greater than benefits, so low mood 
and anxiety increase fitness. 
Payoffs vary across time and projects.  As one activity  continues, such as foraging,  marginal 
benefits decline. When benefits from the current activity become lower than those for an alter­
native, behaviour shifts to the next activity. Charnov's marginal value theorem shows that the 
optimal time for an animal to quit foraging in one location and move to another is when the rate 
of return from the current patch declines below the average rate of  return over several patches 
(1976). Scores of experiments show that even simple organisms make good decisions about when 
to move to a new patch (Real and Caraco, 1986; Stephens and Krebs, 1986). Related mechanisms 
regulate the decision to quit foraging altogether. As the evening air cools, bumblebees eventually 
spend more calories per minute than they gain. At that point, the best thing to do is to stop and 
wait for more propitious conditions (Heinrich, 1979). 
Humans are more complicated. We pursue multiple long-term goals simultaneously.  Success 
depends on judiciously  allocating effort among diverse enterprises,  including  getting  material 
resources, getting and keeping a partner, taking care of children, making and keeping friends, and 
gaining social status. They often conflict, so life is difficult. When a strategy is not working, low 
mood disengages effort and motivates consideration of other ways to reach the goal (Gut, 1989). 
If no strategy seems likely to work, motivation disengages from that enterprise, and shifts effort to 
another. If pursuit of an unreachable goal continues, ordinary low mood can escalate into severe 
depression (Gut, 1989; Klinger, 1975). 
Note that low mood is elicited not by stress or losses, but by inability to make progress towards 
an important goal. After a loss, sadness can improve coping and prevent additional losses (Nesse, 
2005a).  Sadness and low mood are phenomenologically similar, and they  are often  associat­
ed because losses often disrupt strategies for getting crucial resources, but they correspond to 
different situations. 
Anxiety and low mood are also highly co  morbid.  When loss is likely, anxiety is useful. Failing 
efforts to preserve a major life enterprise, such as a marriage or a job, are likely to arouse anxiety 
(because  of the threat of loss) and low mood  (because  efforts to prevent the loss are failing). 
Co  morbidity of depression and anxiety can also arise from the risks of leaving an intolerable job 
or marriage (Maser and Cloninger, 1990). 
The above generic theory has several more domain-specific versions. One group, starting from 
ethological observations (Price, 1967), has emphasized an inability to yield in status competitions 
as the crucial situation that gives rise to depression (Gilbert, 1992; Gilbert and Allan, 1998; Price 
and Sloman, 1987; Price et al. 1994). They interpret depression as 'involuntary yielding behavior' WHY  SO  VULNERABLE?  25 
that stops attacks by dominants. This makes important links with social competition (Price et a!. 
1994) and it helps to explain social aspects of depression symptoms, such as low self-esteem. It 
is also supported by reanalyses of life events data showing that depression is precipitated not 
by stress in general, but by events that involve being trapped or humiliated (Brown et a!. 1995; 
Kendler et a!. 2003). So far, we lack data on what percentage of depressions arise mainly from 
losing status competitions. 
Watson and Andrews (2002) have suggested that depression guides 'social navigation' by 
manipulating others.  They also suggest that depression can focus cognitive effort on solving social 
problems, an idea also proposed by Gut (1989) and Bibring (1953). Hagen argues that depression 
itself and even suicidal tendencies are adaptations to manipulate others to get resources at crucial 
times such as birth of a child (2002). Allen and Badcock (2003) argue that depression is useful 
in situations that involve high risk of exclusion from a social group, to signal submission and 
motivate actions that will make one accepted by the group. These views have been criticized by 
Nettle  (2004) who argues, as I do, that serious depression is rarely useful. He instead emphasizes 
the vulnerability of any system that depends on many genes (Keller and Miller,  2006) and the 
possibility that tendencies to negative emotions may have been selected because they motivate 
high ambition (Ross et a!. 2001). 
The different subtypes of anxiety aroused by different dangers (Marks and N  esse, 1994) suggests 
that selection could also have shaped subtypes of depression to deal with problems in differ­
ent domains. Data confirming this nonobvious prediction support the more general hypothesis 
that depression symptoms are adaptive. Two preliminary studies found significant differences in 
depression symptoms depending on the precipitant  (Keller and Nesse, 2005; 2006b ). Not only are 
the symptoms remarkably different depending on the cause, the patterns are congruent with func­
tional expectations. In a larger replication, bereavement and romantic break-ups were associated 
with sadness, anhedonia, appetite loss, and guilt, while chronic stress and failures were associated 
with fatigue and hypersomnia (Keller et a!. 2007b). If different depression symptoms have different 
functions, studying depression as a single syndrome may conceal  more important phenomena. 
Why so vulnerable? 
Over  10% of people in the United  States experience serious depression, many during early 
adulthood when other chronic diseases are rare (Kessler et a!. 1997). Why has natural selection 
left the mood regulation system so vulnerable to failure? Each of the six categories from Darwinian 
medicine (Nesse and Williams,  1994) offers possible explanations (see text  box 3.3). 
Modern environments may increase the  risk of depression, although no reliable data allow 
comparisons with hunter-gatherer populations (Cordain et a!. 2002). Depressogenic situations 
may be especially common in modern life because goals are far larger and longer in duration than 
those the regulation mechanism was shaped for (Nesse, 2000). Physical factors such as artificial 
light, and changes in exercise and diet that can directly influence brain mechanisms also deserve 
consideration (Frasure-Smith et a!. 2004). 
Infectious causes are likely given the link between inflammatory cytokines and depression 
(Pollak and Yirmiya, 2002; Schiepers et a!. 2005). A large literature documents the utility of 
'sickness behavior' in animals (Hart,  1990). During an infection, effort and conflict are best 
avoided. Specific organisms are rarely identified, although Borna virus may cause a few cases 
(Bode and Ludwig, 2003). Another factor may be autoimmune reactions resulting from lack of 
childhood exposure to the diversity of pathogens found in more natural human environments 
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Constraints on what selection can accomplish are relevant. For instance, complex traits such as 
the ability to regulate mood, tend to have high variance that leaves some individuals at pathological 
extremes (Keller and Miller, 2006). 
Tradeoffs  are probably important. Low mood has costs,  lost opportunities at the very least. 
Inappropriate high mood results in taking risks and wasting energy that may have been even more 
costly. Vulnerability to depression could also result if individuals who struggle especially hard to 
avoid failure tend, on average, to be especially successful (Nettle, 2004; Ross et a!. 2001). 
Finally,  there is the possibility,  emphasized here, that  depression is  prevalent  because human 
social life  routinely results in substantial numbers of individuals getting trapped pursuing 
unreachable goals. The proportion should vary substantially depending on cultural factors, and 
this variation may help to explain cultural differences in depression rates. 
Why are some people more vulnerable to depression than others? This question at the centre 
of much  neuroscience research, is  entirely different from the question of why depression exists, 
but an evolutionary perspective may be useful  nonetheless.  One possibility is that differences in 
baseline mood, and differences in the gain setting for mood regulation systems, may have little 
influence on fitness.  For instance,  SHT -related polymorphisms that increase the risk of depres­
sion in response to life events (Caspi et a!. 2003), interferon (Kraus et a!. 2007), and tryptophan 
depletion (Jans et a!. 2006) may offer benefits in some circumstances; they should not be assumed 
to be defects (Barr et a!. 2004). A  polymorphism that is  associated with decreased synthesis of 
IL-6 protects against depression caused by interferon treatment  (Bull et a!. 2008); one wonders if 
individuals with this polymorphism might be more vulnerable to infection. 
Finally, there is  the question of how to understand the effects of stressors on  mood regulation 
mechanisms. They are usually interpreted as 'kindling' (Post and Weiss,  1998) or otherwise dam­
aging the system. However, the body has many facultative adaptations that adapt individuals to 
their environments. For instance, early heat exposure increases the number of sweat glands. Each 
additional depression episode seems to reduce the threshold for further episodes  (Kendler et a!. 
2000). This may well reflect damage of the same sort that causes chronic pain. It is conceivable, 
however, that it is related to a system that adapts the depression threshold based on experience in 
the social environment. 
Bipolar disorder needs a separate analysis, but increasing evidence that many depressives have 
bipolar tendencies is clearly important (Akiskal, 2003). At the very least, it calls attention to the 
tight links between the BIS and BAS. A control theory approach suggests the existence of a feed­
forward  mechanism  to prevent  overshoot by dampening  mood even as it  rises,  and increasing 
mood soon after it falls (Nesse, 2006). Failure of such a mechanism would explain many aspects 
of bipolar disorder. It is worth noting that this book dedicates three chapters to bipolar disorder, 
and in particular to the similarities  and dissimilarities between  unipolar and bipolar disorders 
(see Chapters 6, 21, and 22). 
Practical implications 
While we await stronger conclusions about the evolutionary origins and functions of low mood, 
an evolutionary approach has practical implications for depression research strategies. 
Measure and analyse specific symptoms, not just depression 
Diagnostic algorithms collapse multiple variables into a binary datum. Depression scales collapse 
multiple symptoms into a single continuous variable. If depression was unitary, these data reduction 
strategies would be sensible. However, different precipitants arouse different symptoms (Keller et a!. 
2007a), so analysing specific symptoms is essential, as is measuring the domain of the precipitant. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS  I  27 
Study etiological  subtypes  of depression 
It has been hard to define depression subtypes based on aetiology, although attempts are being 
made on the basis of patterns of neuroendocrine changes (Antonijevic, 2006). Basing subtypes on 
the category of precipitant is a strategy worth considering. Another is to define categories based 
on the several ways a defensive response can become dysregulated. As shown in the text box below 
(Box 3.4), a normal regulation mechanism does not guarantee that the response will be useful, 
and etiological subtypes of depression correspond to different mechanism abnormalities. 
Put  depression  diagnostic  criteria  on a  scientific foundation 
The diagnosis of DSM-IV Major Depression ignores context, with the telling exception of grief 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). However,  if low mood can be useful,  then distin­
guishing  normal  from pathological  responses  requires considering context  (Horwitz and 
Wakefield, 2007; Nesse and Jackson, 2006). Searching systematically for situations that could 
cause low mood would make the clinical evaluation of depression like that for other medical 
problems,  such as pain, fever, and fatigue, that are investigated  by considering what may be 
arousing the defence. 
Gather data on  motivational  structure 
The evidence that severe life events precipitate depression is overwhelming  (Brown et al. 1988; 
Caspi  et al. 2003; Finlay-Jones  and  Brown,  1981; Kessler, 1997;  Monroe  and Simons, 1991). 
Research has moved steadily from life event checklists  to methods  that take account of the 
individual's life context (Monroe and Simons, 1991; Paykel, 2001). This parallels recognition in 
psychology that emotions are elicited not just by cues, but by an individual's appraisal of what 
information means for ability to reach personal goals (Ellsworth, 1991; Scherer et al. 2001). 
Behavioural ecology has well-established categories  for  the  resources organisms need: 
somatic resources  (personal health, attractiveness and ability, and material resources), repro­
ductive resources  (a mate and offspring),  and social resources  (allies and status)  (Krebs and 
Davies, 1991). Mood is influenced by an individual's  ability to get these resources,  the gaps 
between resources and personal goals, and how individuals cope with these gaps. We need instru­
ments to measure the motivational structure  of individuals' lives.  Such measures would have 
immediate applications.  For instance, how do individuals trapped  pursuing an unreachable 
goal compare to others on HPA  axis abnormalities, agitated depression symptoms, and drug 
response? 
Box 3.4  Etiological subtypes based  on regulation 
mechanism status 
1.  Regulation mechanism is normal; low mood is useful in this specific instance 
2.  Regulation mechanism is normal; low mood is useless or harmful in this specific instance 
3.  Regulation mechanism threshold or gain is abnormal; depression symptoms are excessive 
or deficient 
4.  Regulation  mechanism is fundamentally  abnormal;  depression  symptoms arise without 
a precipitant, or in response to a situation that should not lower mood 
5.  Secondary complications of depression, such as complications of weight loss 
6.  Depression arising from mechanisms unrelated to those that normally regulate mood 28  I  EXPLAINING  DEPRESSION:  NEUROSCIENCE  IS  NOT  ENOUGH,  EVOLUTION  IS  ESSENTIAL 
Consider the many ways  genes  can  influence vulnerability 
About 40% of  the vulnerability to depression can be attributed to genetic differences  (Levinson, 
2006; Sullivan  et al. 2000),  however,  no locus  accounts  for more than a few percentage  of  the 
variation (Holmans et al. 2007). Epigenetics and heterogeneity offer possible explanations (Caspi 
et al. 2003; Levinson, 2006). However, thousands of genes influence the brain systems that regu­
late mood, so polymorphisms at  many loci will influence depression vulnerability. Why none 
have major effects remains a good evolutionary question. One possible answer is that polymor­
phisms with large effects on mood may have been selected out. 
A second implication is that genes may influence depression by complex indirect pathways. 
One comprehensive developmental model considers 64 pathways (Sullivan et al. 2000), however, 
other  pathways may  be  even  less  direct.  For instance,  diet and exercise influence depression 
(Duman, 2005), so genetic variations that influence food or exercise preferences (Heller et al. 
1988) should influence mood.  Likewise,  any polymorphism that increases the likelihood of 
becoming trapped in the pursuit of an unreachable life goal should contribute to depression. 
Animal models 
The Porsolt test uses rat swimming behaviour to identify promising new drugs; longer swimming 
is presumed to indicate delayed onset of helplessness (Petit-Demouliere et al. 2005). But when 
rats stop swimming they do not drown, they just float, a fine adaptive strategy. Rats on antide­
pressants swim  more  than  is optimal; in a  natural environment they would drown  sooner 
(Nadeau, 1999). New strategies for drug discovery may emerge from animal models based on 
goal pursuit. Animal models of depression are discussed in several chapters of this book  (see 
Chapters 7-12). 
Study functional effects of antidepressants 
Much research on antidepressants presumes that they normalize some aspect of  neurochemistry 
(Barden et al.  1995). However, if some depression is an excessive response from a normal system, 
then antidepressants may act by blocking the low mood system at various loci in the same ways 
that analgesics block pain. Antidepressants usually do not cause euphoria for the same reason that 
aspirin does not lower body temperature below normal.  The common phylogenetic origins of 
pain, anxiety, and low mood in the BIS may explain why antidepressants tend to be useful for 
blocking diverse defensive responses. The last chapter of this book  (Chapter 27) illustrates the 
future directions for antidepressants research. 
Conclusion 
Mainstream research on the causes of depression has been making full use of  only one half of 
biology. Asking evolutionary as well as proximate questions should speed progress, especially for 
disorders such as depression that can arise from dysregulation of useful responses. The above 
proposals about specific functions of low mood and its relationship to depression need much 
more work before they can be considered confirmed. The broad thesis of this article is not that we 
ill  ow why depression exists, it is that seeking the answer will bring major advances. 
This perspective is prone to misunderstanding. The utility of some low mood does not imply 
·_-_Jt  we should not treat depression.  Quite the contrary.  Much of general medicine consists of 
-:  -�\-ing suffering  by blocking pain,  cough,  and other aversive  symptoms even when they are 
-,,  �al  responses to a problem  whose  source is still being  sought.  Furthermore, the utility  of 
"  -,:  :ow mood is fully compatible with the hypothesis that some clinical depression arises from REFERENC ES  I  29 
abnormal brain mechanisms, and most arises from interactions of brain variations with environ­
mental situations. There is nothing radical about an evolutionary approach to mood disorders, 
and the enterprise should not be viewed as controversial, although straightforward reasoning 
from well-established evolutionary principles can yield surprising conclusions. More important, 
it suggests specific new research that is badly needed. 
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